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 BOOKS REVIEWS
 A book reviewer occupies a position of special
 responsibility and trust. He is to summarize, set in
 context, describe strengths, and point out weaknesses.
 As a surrogate for us all, he assumes a heavy obligation
 which it is his duty to discharge with reason and
 consistency.
 Admiral H.G. Rickover
 "A Rare and Especially Insightful Document"
 Captain Wayne P. Hughes, U.S. Navy (Retired)
 McCue, Brian. U- Boats in the Bay of Biscay: An Essay in Operations Analysis.
 Washington, D.C.: National Defense Univ. Press, 1990. 206pp.
 IN offers THIS a fresh BOOK-LENGTH look at the Battle ESSAY, of the U-Boats Atlantic. in the He Bay has of reexamined Biscay, Brian the McCue many offers a fresh look at the Battle of the Atlantic. He has reexamined the m ny
 interrelated conclusions reached in the major studies of that long and arduous
 campaign, and has updated them with the new information available - notably
 the influence of Enigma and the Allied codebreaking effort. McCue's con-
 clusions are not sharply revisionist, but there are enough fresh insights to attract
 any student of naval history. Do not be put off by the title. McCue believes that
 the Bay of Biscay was in its own special way the critical theater, but he has
 reexamined the Battle of the Atlantic in its entirety.
 McCue introduces models of the campaign drawn from three essential books
 of antisubmarine warfare (ASW) analysis first issued by the navy's Operations
 Evaluation Group after the war: Morse and Kimball's Methods of Operations
 Research , D.O. Koopman's Search and Screening , and Sternhell and Thomdike's
 ASW Operations in World War II. New data comes from a vast number of sources,
 the best available now that most of the returns are in. McCue has adapted some
 straightforward modeling (both at the tactical and campaign level) that was
 developed by the World War II analysts and has explored the war against the
 U-boat in a surprisingly fresh fashion. In effect McCue completes the analysis that
 the World War II OEG analysts never had a chance to finish.
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 Thus McCue's purpose is one almost unique in our navy today: to bridge the
 gap between history and operations analysis and produce a legitimately scientific
 study in which historical insights are substantiated with analysis, and analytical
 models are corroborated with historical data. Unlike the U.S. Army, which has
 never ceased to blend history and analysis, the navy has failed to nurture these
 uniquely valuable historical-analytical studies in recent years. McCue's short but
 searching book is a notable exception.
 McCue has summarized the ASW war in the bay, with all of its tactical-tech-
 nological lessons about electronic measures and countermeasures; a straightfor-
 ward historical-empirical quantitative account has resulted. Thus far it is, in
 McCue's words, a "bookkeeper's analysis," working from back to front, from
 effects to causes. Representing the dynamics of the campaign with appropriate
 models, the author performs as an analyst might have done in the midst of the
 war - analyzing the causes to effects.
 McCue expands his thesis from the Biscay operations to the entire Atlantic
 campaign. Relying on Morse and Kimball's pioneering work, McCue has
 constructed a model of the Atlantic theater that is so transparent that every reader
 will see what is happening. His model - "if-only-they-had" - suggests a less
 dramatic effect on the total campaign than many historians in the past believed.
 I think readers will find this portion of the book most fascinating.
 For example, McCue argues that, except for either more U-boats or an early
 increase in U-boat quality (more Type XXI boats), the most effective single
 German action toward winning the war could have been adding " milch cows " to
 the small number of U-boat tankers. These would have given the attacking
 U-boats longer and more useful lives in the shipping lanes. On the Allied side,
 codebreaking is shown to have been of even greater importance than previously
 thought, because of its ability to pinpoint the U-boat tanker locations and allow
 hunter-killer groups to sweep them up.
 Another interesting concept is McCue's observation that, in view of the large
 repair queue that built up in the Biscay U-boat pens, one of the most effective
 actions Dönitz might have taken would have been to increase (or better sustain)
 the maintenance capacity there. We know that bombing the submarine pens did
 little damage to U-boats; but would a redirected bombing effort have achieved
 more? Not likely. Elsewhere McCue observes that the payoff of bombing attacks
 on the pens was much less than that of the same number of flying hours in close
 escort of threatened convoys. Based on U-boats damaged or destroyed, the
 relative effectiveness was in the ration of 1 : 1 5 (Morse and Kimball had calculated
 1:30). We must remember that one of the most important contributions of air
 escort was to suppress the wolf packs, thereby keeping the U-boats submerged
 and immobile in the vicinity of the convoys. Moreover, bombing attacks on the
 pens were more hazardous than blue- water operations. If anything, the 1:15
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 effectiveness ratio probably understates the differential worth of the two alterna-
 tives, even after factoring in the indirect effects of air attacks on the Biscay ports.
 The variations McCue explores appear to have had the potential to reverse
 the outcome of the Atlantic campaign at the beginning of 1943. There was
 nothing Dönitz could have done to stem the tide of American Liberty ships,
 escorts, and AS W aircraft that was inundating the U-boats. The accuracy of
 Dönitz's own conclusion that Hitler started the war too soon, before his U-boat
 navy was strong enough, appears absolute. Dönitz's own prewar estimate was
 that Germany needed to sink 800,000 tons per month to starve England. This
 is an uncannily shrewd macro-analytical judgment. He almost, but not quite,
 built up to that level - but he could never have sustained it.
 Throughout the book McCue's recognition that the essence of an ASW
 campaign was, and still is, a campaign of search , is manifest. A submarine war is
 a guerrilla war at sea: where U-boats stalk merchant ships while ASW forces
 search for U-boats, the nexus of the two efforts being the convoys themselves.
 What you can find you can kill - perhaps not every time but often enough that
 when the search effort succeeds the battle will be won. In chapter four, McCue
 accordingly includes a primer on search theory: sweep rate, sweep width, the
 random search and inverse-cube-law search algorithms, the "balanced search"
 concept, and more. These were analytical tools invented by World War II
 analysts, and remain as sound and essential today as then.
 In fact, McCue is, justifiably, more than a little impatient with modern
 analysts. He writes, "a final reason for the high quality of wartime operations
 research must be noted: the employment of geniuses. [The British Operational
 Research section included two Nobel Prize winners and five Fellows of the
 Royal Society.] The war effort plucked these individuals from their natural
 habitats and set them to work seven days a week, 52 weeks a year. Today's
 peacetime efforts - many of which are in fact window dressing or rococo
 computer make- work - cannot hope to engage such talent with such intensity."
 I was so enchanted with The Bay of Biscay because of the memories it brought
 back. In 1961, when I was a lieutenant and Ops officer of a destroyer in an ASW
 hunter-killer group, I found a copy of OEG Report 51, the aforementioned
 AS W Operations in World War II. The first half of the report was a narrative of
 the Battle of the Atlantic. I was spellbound. The last half contained some of the
 basic models and analyses that were developed and used by the Operations
 Evaluation Group. I was in awe; but it was about tactics, so I read it. The stuff
 was magic. It was mathematical legerdemain that, after three years chasing
 submarines, I could see was really practical but which took a special insight to
 create - something I did not possess. It explained, for example, from where our
 search and screen plans originated. I understood how they were sometimes
 misused, out of ignorance, by the OTC's staff, in their lack of appreciation for
 the progress of technology between 1942 and 1962. 1 was hooked by this tactical
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 magic, and in due course was awarded a master of operations analysis degree
 from the Naval Postgraduate School.
 I can not summarize the significance of this straightforward, tightly written,
 two-hundred page book more adroitly than has Vice Admiral Jack Baldwin in
 his foreword. He writes that McCue "validates the usefulness of their [the
 wartime analysts'] techniques even as he clarifies and identifies the limits of their
 analysis [in the midst of war] . In a key finding, he stresses the overwhelming
 importance of selecting appropriate measures of effectiveness when attempting
 to quantify military operations. Beyond its obvious appeal to the military
 operations research community, McCue's essay generates broad principles -
 supported by both empirical evidence and analytical modeling - of interest to
 national security strategists and policymakers. For example, his critical analysis
 of the troubles with the 'top-down* approach used by current defense analysts
 has great currency for modem policymakers. McCue's conclusions might
 reasonably be extended to the measurement of other military endeavors, such
 as bomber operations or antimissile defense studies."
 Fiske, Bradley A. The Navy as a Fight-
i g Machine. nnapolis, Md.: The
Naval Institute Press, 1988. 387pp.
 $32.95
 Bradley Allen Fiske (1854-1942)
 was the Thomas Jefferson of the
 American Navy. He was a Renaissance
 man who set his hand and mind to
 many things and did them all quite
 well. He invented naval "appliances,"
 commanded ships and fleets at sea, and
 wrote widely on the uses of naval
 power and the operations of navies.
 Fiske was an early champion of
 preparedness and quantitative think-
 ing. His book is as stimulating to read
 today as it must have been when it was
 first published in 1916. While reading
 Fiske, this reviewer had the distinct
 impression of being engaged in a live-
 ly, real-time dialogue with a very
 modern mind.
 Fiske graduated from the Naval
 Academy in 1874, and spent the next
 eighteen years in various posts while
 turning his mind to the invention of
 naval appliances (his word). These in-
 cluded electric logs (speed indicators)
 and depth sounders, and electric
 drives for ammunition hoists, turret
 training and gun elevation machinery,
 and range finders. He attended the
 Naval War College in 1896 and was
 exposed to and influenced by that
 magnificent collection of minds as-
 sembled there in the late nineteenth
 century. This influence became ap-
 parent when Fiske began writing for
 the Naval Institute Proceedings . His ar-
 ticles examined the navy as an in-
 tegrated system for the application of
 naval power to national purposes.
 After four years at sea, as captain and
 ear admiral, he was aide for opera-
 tions to Secretary of the Navy,
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